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South Carolina DUI Laws and Drunk Driving Information
It is unlawful for a person to drive a motor vehicle within this State while:
(1) under the influence of alcohol to the extent that the person's faculties to drive are materially and appreciably impaired;
(2) under the influence of any other drug or a combination of other drugs or substances which cause impairment to the extent that the person's faculties to drive are materially and appreciably impaired; or
(3) under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drug or drugs or substances which cause impairment to the extent that the person's faculties to drive are materially and appreciably impaired.
SECTION 56-5-2930 and SECTION 56-5-2940 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways is applicable only to those offenses of driving while under the influence of alcoholic beverages which occur within the boundaries of the State of South Carolina, or within the political subdivisions and municipalities herein. 1980 Op Atty Gen, No 80-46, p 92.
It is the duty of the arresting officer or the person conducting a chemical test of a person arrested for driving under the influence to assist that person in contacting a qualified person to conduct a blood test. 1978 Op Atty Gen, No 78-174, p 201.
A person may be arrested for DUI while steering a towed motor vehicle. 1975-76 Op Atty Gen, No 4330, p 154.
Municipal courts have jurisdictions of first offense drunk driving violations under State law. 1971--72 Op Atty Gen, No 3262, p 59.
A person arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants may be compelled to submit to a blood test, and the results are admissible. 1969-70 Op Atty Gen, No 3019, p 307.
A blood test may be required without search warrant after the arrest of a person for driving under the influence, and the results are admissible. 1969-70 Op Atty Gen, No 3019, p 307
.
Suspension of driver's license. Code 1962 section 46-348, requiring the suspension of the driver's license of persons convicted under this section [Code 1962 Section 46-343], relates the length of the suspension to the number of convictions and not to the punishment imposed therefor. 1965-66 Op Atty Gen, No 2192, p 336.
SECTION 56-5-2933.
It is unlawful for a person to drive a motor vehicle within this State while his alcohol concentration is eight one-hundredths of one percent or more. A person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of the offense of Driving With An Unlawful Alcohol Concentration. A person may be charged for a violation of Section 56-5-2930 but prosecuted pursuant to this section if the original testing of the person's breath or collection of other bodily fluids was performed within two hours of the time of arrest and articulable suspicion existed to justify the traffic stop. This section does not apply to cases arising out of a stop at a traffic roadblock or driver's license checkpoint. A person shall not be prosecuted for both a violation of Section 56-5-2930 and a violation of this section for the same incident. A person who violates the provisions of this section is entitled to a jury trial and is afforded the right to challenge certain factors including, but not limited to, the following:
(1) whether or not the person was lawfully arrested or detained;
(2) whether or not articulable suspicion existed to justify the stop;
(3) the period of time between arrest and testing;
(4) whether or not the person was advised in writing of the rights enumerated in Section 56-5-2950;
(5) whether the person consented to taking a test pursuant to Section 56-5-2950, and the:
(a) reported alcohol concentration at the time of testing was eight one- hundredths of one percent or more;
(b) individual who administered the test or took samples was qualified pursuant to Section 56-5-2950;
(c) tests administered and samples obtained were conducted pursuant to Section 56-5-2950 and regulations adopted pursuant to Section 56-5-2951(Q) and Section 56-5-2953(F); and
(d) machine was working properly.
Nothing contained in this section prohibits the introduction of:
(1) the results of any additional tests of the person's breath or other bodily fluids;
(2) any evidence that may corroborate or question the validity of the breath or bodily fluid test result including, but not limited to:
(a) evidence of field sobriety tests;
(b) evidence of the amount of alcohol consumed by the person; and
(c) evidence of the person's driving;
(3) a videotape of the person's conduct at the incident site and breath testing site taken pursuant to Section 56-5-2953 which is subject to redaction under the South Carolina Rules of Evidence; or
(4) any other evidence of the state of a person's faculties to drive which would call into question the results of a breath or bodily fluid test.
At trial, a person charged with a violation of this section is entitled to a jury instruction stating that the factors enumerated above and the totality of the evidence produced at trial may be used by the jury to determine guilt or innocence.
A person charged with a violation of this section must be given notice of intent to prosecute under the provisions of this section at least fourteen days before his trial date.
SECTION 56-5-2934.
In addition, at the time of arrest for a violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945, the arresting officer, in addition to other notice requirements, must inform the defendant of his right to all hearings provided by law to include those if a breath test is refused or taken with a result that would require license suspension. The arresting officer, if the defendant wishes to avail himself of any such hearings, depending on the choices made or the breath test results obtained, must provide the defendant with the appropriate form to request the hearing or hearings. The defendant must acknowledge receipt of the notice requirements and receipt of the hearing form if such a hearing or hearings are desired.
SECTION 56-5-2935.
SECTION 56-5-2936.
Implementation of compulsory testimony requirement postponed; training of employees.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the State Law Enforcement Division is not required to implement the provisions of Section 56-5-2934 as contained in Section 9 of Act 390 of 2000 pertaining to the compulsory process for obtaining witnesses including, but not limited to, state employees charged with the maintenance of breath testing devices in this State and the administration of breath testing pursuant to Chapter 5 of Title 56 of the 1976 Code, until the time the General Assembly is adequately able to fund the program or by December 31, 2002, whichever first occurs. Provided, however, by December 31, 2002, the State Law Enforcement Division must have at least three state employees trained and prepared for the purpose of appearing in court and testifying on the maintenance of breath testing devices and the administration of breath testing pursuant to Chapter 5, Title 56 of the 1976 Code.
SECTION 56-5-2940.
A person who violates a provision of Section 56-5-2930 or 56-5-2933, upon conviction, entry of a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere, or forfeiture of bail must be punished:
(1) by a fine of four hundred dollars or imprisonment for not less than forty-eight hours nor more than thirty days, for the first offense; however, in lieu of the forty-eight hour minimum imprisonment, the court may provide for forty-eight hours of public service employment. The minimum forty-eight hour imprisonment or public service employment must be served at a time when the person is off from work and does not interfere with his regular employment under terms and conditions as the court considers proper. However, the court may not compel an offender to perform public service employment in lieu of the minimum sentence;
(2) by a fine of not less than two thousand one hundred dollars nor more than five thousand one hundred dollars and imprisonment for not less than five days nor more than one year for the second offense. However, the fine imposed by this item shall not be suspended in an amount less than one thousand one hundred dollars. In lieu of service of imprisonment, the court may require that the individual complete an appropriate term of public service employment of not less than thirty days upon terms and conditions the court considers proper;
(3) by a fine of not less than three thousand eight hundred dollars nor more than six thousand three hundred dollars and imprisonment for not less than sixty days nor more than three years for the third offense;
(4) by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years for a fourth offense or subsequent offense.
No part of the minimum sentences provided in this section may be suspended. The court may provide instead of service other sentences provided in this section. For a third or subsequent offense or for a violation of Section 56-5-2945 for great bodily injury, the service of the minimum sentence is mandatory. However, the judge may provide for the sentence to be served upon terms and conditions as he considers proper including, but not limited to, weekend service or nighttime service in any fashion he considers necessary.
The fine for a first offense may not be suspended. The court is prohibited from suspending a monetary fine below that of the next preceding minimum monetary fine.
For the purposes of this chapter any conviction, entry of a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere, or forfeiture of bail for the violation of any law or ordinance of this or any other state or any municipality of this or any other state that prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drugs, or narcotics constitutes a prior offense for the purpose of any prosecution for any subsequent violation hereof. Only those violations which occurred within a period of ten years including and immediately preceding the date of the last violation constitute prior violations within the meaning of this section.
Upon imposition of a sentence of public service, the defendant may apply to the court to be allowed to perform his public service in his county of residence if he has been sentenced to public service in a county where he does not reside.
One hundred dollars of each fine imposed pursuant to this section must be placed by the Comptroller General into a special restricted account to be used by the Department of Public Safety for the Highway Patrol.
Two hundred dollars of the fine imposed pursuant to subsection (3) must be placed by the Comptroller General into a special restricted account to be used by the State Law Enforcement Division to offset the costs of administration of the datamaster, breath testing site video program, ignition interlock provisions, and toxicology laboratory.
SECTION 56-5-2930 and SECTION 56-5-2940 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways is applicable only to those offenses of driving while under the influence of alcoholic beverages which occur within the boundaries of the State of South Carolina, or within the political subdivisions and municipalities herein. 1980 Op Atty Gen, No 80-46, p 92.
Recorder's jurisdiction of second drunk driving offense. A recorder has only jurisdiction to issue an arrest warrant, hold preliminary hearing, and either throw out or send on a second drunk driving offense for disposition before the general sessions court. He would not have authority to try the case and dispose of it for all purposes. 1963-64 Op Atty Gen, No 1612, p 29.
In the absence of legislation expressly stating that the clerk of the circuit court is responsible for transmitting fines imposed in a magistrate's or municipal court for a case transferred to the docket of that court from general sessions, there appears to be no responsibility for the clerk in such regard. However, there appears to be no prohibition to any assistance by the clerk with the consent of the magistrate as to such fines. 1992 Op Atty Gen No. 92-29.
Sentencing judge lacks authority to suspend all or part of monetary fine imposed upon a person convicted of felony DUI. Language contained in Section 56-5-2945, that no part of mandatory "sentences" may be suspended, includes fines imposed as well as imprisonment set forth. 1993 Op Atty Gen No. 93-22.
SECTION 56-5-2941.
In addition to the penalties required and authorized to be imposed against a person violating the provisions of Section 56-5-2930 , 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945, the court may require such person, whether or not he is a first or subsequent offender and if he is a resident of this State, to have installed on the vehicle he was operating if it is registered and licensed in his name or in the name of a member of his immediate family an ignition interlock device designed to prevent the operation of the motor vehicle if the operator has consumed alcoholic beverages. The court in imposing the requirements of this section shall specify the length of time which the interlock device is required to be affixed to the vehicle, shall provide that the cost of the interlock device must be borne by the offender, and shall require the offender to periodically report to appropriate law enforcement or probation authorities for the purpose of verifying that the interlock device is affixed to the vehicle and operational during the time required by the court. The State Law Enforcement Division, in consultation with the Department of Public Safety, shall develop regulations including, but not limited to, regulations governing the use, maintenance, and operation of ignition interlock devices.
If the offender is determined to be indigent by the court and cannot afford the cost of the ignition interlock device, the court may order an interlock device to be affixed to the vehicle and paid for by the jurisdiction making the arrest from fines paid pursuant to Sections 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, and 56-5-2945.
SECTION 56-5-2942.
(B) For purposes of this section, "immobilized" and " immobilization" mean suspension and surrender of the registration and motor vehicle license plate.
(C) Upon sentencing for a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945, the court must ascertain the registration numbers or other information to determine the identity of the vehicles to be immobilized. The court must notify the Department of Motor Vehicles of a person's conviction for a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945 and the identity of the vehicles to be immobilized.
(D) Upon notification by a court in this State or by any other state of a conviction for a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945, the department must require the person convicted to surrender all license plates and vehicle registrations subject to immobilization pursuant to this section. The immobilization is for a period of thirty days to take place during the driver's license suspension pursuant to a conviction for a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945. The department must maintain a record of all vehicles immobilized pursuant to this section.
(E) An immobilized motor vehicle must be released to the holder of a bona fide lien on the motor vehicle when possession of the motor vehicle is requested, as provided by law, by the lienholder for the purpose of foreclosing on and satisfying the lien.
(F) An immobilized motor vehicle may be released by the department without legal or physical restraints to a person who has not been convicted of a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945, if that person is a registered owner of the motor vehicle or a member of the household of a registered owner. The vehicle must be released if an affidavit is submitted by that person to the department stating that:
(1) he regularly drives the motor vehicle subject to immobilization;
(2) the immobilized motor vehicle is necessary to his employment, transportation to an educational facility, or for the performance of essential household duties;
(3) no other vehicle is available for the use of the person;
(4) the person will not authorize the use of the motor vehicle by any other person known by him to have been convicted of a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945;
(5) the person will report immediately to a local law enforcement agency any unauthorized use of the motor vehicle by a person known by him to have been convicted of a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945.
(G) The department may conduct a hearing and receive testimony regarding the veracity of an affidavit submitted pursuant to subsection (F) or issue an agency decision to permit or deny the release of the vehicle based on the affidavit. A person may seek relief pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act from an agency action immobilizing a vehicle or denying the release of the vehicle.
(H) A person who operates an immobilized vehicle except as provided in subsections (E) and (F) is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days.
(I) A person who falsifies a report concerning vehicles owned by or registered to that person, or who fails to surrender registrations and license plates pursuant to this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days.
(J) The court must assess a fee of forty dollars for each motor vehicle owned by or registered to the person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945. This fee must be placed by the Comptroller General into a special restricted interest bearing account to be used by the Department of Motor Vehicles to defray the expenses of the Department of Motor Vehicles.
SECTION 56-5-2945.
(A) A person who, while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or the combination of alcohol and drugs, drives a vehicle and when driving does any act forbidden by law or neglects any duty imposed by law in the driving of the vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes great bodily injury or death to a person other than himself, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction must be punished:
(1) by a mandatory fine of not less than five thousand one hundred dollars nor more than ten thousand one hundred dollars and mandatory imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more than fifteen years when great bodily injury results;
(2) by a mandatory fine of not less than ten thousand one hundred dollars nor more than twenty-five thousand one hundred dollars and mandatory imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than twenty-five years when death results.
A part of the mandatory sentences required to be imposed by this section must not be suspended, and probation must not be granted for any portion.
(B) As used in this section, "great bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
The Department of Motor Vehicles must suspend the driver's license of a person who is convicted or who receives sentence upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere pursuant to this section for a period to include a term of imprisonment plus three years.
(C) One hundred dollars of each fine imposed pursuant to this section must be placed by the Comptroller General into a special restricted account to be used by the Department of Public Safety for the Highway Patrol.
SECTION 56-5-2945 does not expressly repeal the existing offenses of involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide, and construction of the statute indicates that repeal by implication is not intended. State v. Bodiford (S.C. 1984) 282 S.C. 378, 318 S.E.2d 567.
3. Lesser included offenses
Reckless driving is not a lesser included offense of felony driving under the influence (DUI), since recklessness is not required to support a conviction for felony DUI. State v. Cribb (S.C. 1992) 310 S.C. 518, 426 S.E.2d 306. Indictment And Information 191(.5)
Reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter are not lesser included offenses of felony driving under the influence (DUI) since recklessness is not required to support a conviction for felony DUI, thus overruling prior case law to the contrary. State v. Cribb (S.C. 1992) 310 S.C. 518, 426 S.E.2d 306. Indictment And Information 191(.5)
4. Jeopardy
Double jeopardy will bar conviction where the state attempts to prove felony driving under the influence with proof of a violation of the same law under which the defendant has already been convicted in magistrate's court. State v. Grampus (S.C. 1986) 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26. Double Jeopardy 142
Felony driving under the influence prosecution violated defendants constitutional protection against double jeopardy where the lane change violation, which was critical to the felony prosecution, was the same offense for which defendant had previously been convicted in magistrate's court. State v. Grampus (S.C. 1986) 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26.
5. Indictment
Indictment charging defendant with felony driving under the influence (DUI) resulting in death was sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the circuit court; indictment contained virtually identical language to that contained in the statute defining the offense, thorough review of the record disclosed no indications of uncertainty in regard to the crime with which defendant was charged, and because she pled guilty, it was clear she was aware of the nature of the charge against her. State v. Campbell (S.C.App. 2004) 361 S.C. 529, 605 S.E.2d 576. Indictment And Information 110(47)
The indictment must state with particularity the act forbidden by law or duty imposed by law which will be relied on by the state to support the felony driving under the influence charge. State v. Grampus (S.C. 1986) 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26.
6. Expert witnesses
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying as an expert a police officer who testified, in a trial for felony driving under the influence, that he observed a "gouge mark" in the victim's lane "indicating to [him] that the collision had taken place in [the victim's] lane" where the officer testified that (1) he had received 12 weeks training in the state Highway Department Academy which included specific training on determining the point of impact in an accident investigation, (2) he spent one week in on-the-road training with a municipal police force, and (3) he had been a state trooper with 4-5 months' experience at the time of the crime. State v. Goode (S.C.App. 1991) 305 S.C. 176, 406 S.E.2d 391.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying as an expert a police officer who testified, in a trial for felony driving under the influence, as to the defendant's post impact speed where the officer was a 16-year veteran with the Highway Patrol, had received advanced accident investigation and reconstruction training, and had investigated approximately 1600 accidents. State v. Goode (S.C.App. 1991) 305 S.C. 176, 406 S.E.2d 391.
A lab technologist was not qualified as an expert to testify that a person with a blood alcohol reading in excess of .100 milligrams per deciliter is considered intoxicated. Although competent to conduct tests determining blood alcohol content, the technologist admitted that he had no training whatsoever in determining the effect of alcohol upon the human system and, therefore, his testimony on the issue of intoxication was inadmissible. State v. Priester (S.C. 1990) 301 S.C. 165, 391 S.E.2d 227.
7. Multiple convictions
Three convictions for felony driving under influence (DUI) arising out of single accident subjected motorist to three separate and consecutive three-year driver's license suspensions, rather than one three-year suspension. Thompson v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety (S.C. 1999) 335 S.C. 52, 515 S.E.2d 761, rehearing denied. Automobiles 144.2(8)
A defendant's multiple convictions for driving under the influence causing death, reckless homicide, felony driving under the influence causing great bodily injury along, and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause; although the convictions all arose from a single incident, they were separate offenses. State v. Easler (S.C.App. 1996) 322 S.C. 333, 471 S.E.2d 745, rehearing denied, certiorari granted, affirmed as modified 327 S.C. 121, 489 S.E.2d 617.
8. Admissibility of evidence
In prosecutions for driving under the influence (DUI), when moving to admit blood alcohol test results, the State must prove a chain of custody of the blood sample from the time it is drawn until it is tested. Ex parte Department of Health and Environmental Control (S.C. 2002) 350 S.C. 243, 565 S.E.2d 293. Automobiles 425
In a prosecution for felony driving under the influence, the trial court properly allowed the state's forensic toxicologist, who qualified as an expert witness, to testify concerning the elimination rate of alcohol and the effects of benzodiazepine when used in combination with alcohol after admitting that different "benzos" have difference effects and he did not know which benzodiazepine the defendant had taken, since such factors went to the weight of the testimony, and not its admissibility. State v. White (S.C.App. 1993) 311 S.C. 289, 428 S.E.2d 740, rehearing denied. Criminal Law 486(7)
In a prosecution for felony driving under the influence, the State sufficiently established the chain of custody of the defendant's blood sample where each person who handled the blood sample testified at trial, and a lab technologist testified that the samples she picked up from the nurses' desk at the hospital were identified by the receiving nurse as the defendant's and were clearly labeled with his name. State v. Priester (S.C. 1990) 301 S.C. 165, 391 S.E.2d 227.
9. Term of imprisonment
Probation, a suspension of the period of incarceration, is part of a criminal defendant's "term of imprisonment," as is actual incarceration, parole, the suspended portion of a sentence, and supervised furlough. Thompson v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety (S.C. 1999) 335 S.C. 52, 515 S.E.2d 761, rehearing denied. Sentencing And Punishment 1165; Sentencing And Punishment 1167; Sentencing And Punishment 1168
"Term of imprisonment," as used in portion of felony driving under influence (DUI) statute which provides that driver's license of any person convicted thereunder shall be suspended for period to include any term of imprisonment plus three years, means non-fine part of criminal sentence, and includes suspended portions, probation or parole periods, and supervised furlough; it is not limited to period of actual incarceration; overruling Davis v. South Carolina Dep't of Public Safety, 328 S.C. 578, 493 S.E.2d 871. Thompson v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety (S.C. 1999) 335 S.C. 52, 515 S.E.2d 761, rehearing denied. Automobiles 144.2(8)
SECTION 56-5-2946.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person must submit to either one or a combination of chemical tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of alcohol and drugs if there is probable cause to believe that the person violated or is under arrest for a violation of Section 56-5-2945.
The tests must be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that the person violated or is under arrest for a violation of Section 56-5-2945. The administration of one test does not preclude the administration of other tests. The resistance, obstruction, or opposition to testing pursuant to this section is evidence admissible at the trial of the offense which precipitated the requirement for testing. A person who is tested or gives samples for testing may have a qualified person of his choice conduct additional tests at his expense and must be notified of that right. A person's request or failure to request additional blood or urine tests is not admissible against the person in the criminal trial.
The provisions of Section 56-5-2950, relating to the administration of tests to determine a person's alcohol concentration, additional tests at the person's expense, the availability of other evidence on the question of whether or not the person was under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of them, availability of test information to the person or his attorney, and the liability of medical institutions and persons administering the tests are applicable to this section and also extend to the officer requesting the test, the State or its political subdivisions, or governmental agency, or entity which employs the officer making the request, and the agency, institution, or employer, either governmental or private, of persons administering the tests. Notwithstanding any other provision of state law pertaining to confidentiality of hospital records or other medical records, information regarding tests performed pursuant to this section must be released, upon subpoena, to a court, prosecuting attorney, defense attorney, or law enforcement officer in connection with an alleged violation of Section 56-5-2945.
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If you have been charged with a South Carolina DUI there are two
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1) Take the charge seriously.
A conviction for a South Carolina DUI will have long lasting
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and your personal freedom.
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Lawyer.
Understanding the South Carolina DUI laws and courtroom proceedings
can be a challenge. Hiring a qualified South Carolina DUI Lawyer from
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The South Carolina DUI Defense Lawyers at DUILaws.com offer an initial review of your case. Your inquiry is both free and confidential.
To begin fighting your South Carolina DUI, use the drop-down menu above to locate a South Carolina Attorney in your county. But do it now, as time is very critical in a South Carolina DUI case.
South Carolina DUI Laws and Drunk Driving Information
If you arrested for suspicion of a South Carolina DUI you must realize
that South Carolina is an implied consent state. This means
that anyone who has a South Carolina driver’s license has consented
(impliedly) to a test to determine whether or not they are legally
intoxicated.
In South Carolina you are legally intoxicated you’re your
blood alcohol concentration is at or above .08. South
Carolina is a member of the interstate Drivers license compact which
means that if you are arrested for a South Carolina DUI, even if you do
not live there this charge will be reported to your home
state. South Carolina is the only state that requires the
arresting officer to videotape the DUI arrest and field sobriety tests
if administered. While many states do videotape these DUI arrests South
Carolina is the only state in which it is mandatory.
South Carolina DUI Laws
Operating motor vehicle while under influence of alcohol or drugs.
SECTION 56-5-2930.Operating motor vehicle while under influence of alcohol or drugs.
It is unlawful for a person to drive a motor vehicle within this State while:
(1) under the influence of alcohol to the extent that the person's faculties to drive are materially and appreciably impaired;
(2) under the influence of any other drug or a combination of other drugs or substances which cause impairment to the extent that the person's faculties to drive are materially and appreciably impaired; or
(3) under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drug or drugs or substances which cause impairment to the extent that the person's faculties to drive are materially and appreciably impaired.
SECTION 56-5-2930 and SECTION 56-5-2940 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways is applicable only to those offenses of driving while under the influence of alcoholic beverages which occur within the boundaries of the State of South Carolina, or within the political subdivisions and municipalities herein. 1980 Op Atty Gen, No 80-46, p 92.
It is the duty of the arresting officer or the person conducting a chemical test of a person arrested for driving under the influence to assist that person in contacting a qualified person to conduct a blood test. 1978 Op Atty Gen, No 78-174, p 201.
A person may be arrested for DUI while steering a towed motor vehicle. 1975-76 Op Atty Gen, No 4330, p 154.
Municipal courts have jurisdictions of first offense drunk driving violations under State law. 1971--72 Op Atty Gen, No 3262, p 59.
A person arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants may be compelled to submit to a blood test, and the results are admissible. 1969-70 Op Atty Gen, No 3019, p 307.
A blood test may be required without search warrant after the arrest of a person for driving under the influence, and the results are admissible. 1969-70 Op Atty Gen, No 3019, p 307
.
Suspension of driver's license. Code 1962 section 46-348, requiring the suspension of the driver's license of persons convicted under this section [Code 1962 Section 46-343], relates the length of the suspension to the number of convictions and not to the punishment imposed therefor. 1965-66 Op Atty Gen, No 2192, p 336.
SECTION 56-5-2933.
Driving with an unlawful alcohol
concentration.
It is unlawful for a person to drive a motor vehicle within this State while his alcohol concentration is eight one-hundredths of one percent or more. A person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of the offense of Driving With An Unlawful Alcohol Concentration. A person may be charged for a violation of Section 56-5-2930 but prosecuted pursuant to this section if the original testing of the person's breath or collection of other bodily fluids was performed within two hours of the time of arrest and articulable suspicion existed to justify the traffic stop. This section does not apply to cases arising out of a stop at a traffic roadblock or driver's license checkpoint. A person shall not be prosecuted for both a violation of Section 56-5-2930 and a violation of this section for the same incident. A person who violates the provisions of this section is entitled to a jury trial and is afforded the right to challenge certain factors including, but not limited to, the following:
(1) whether or not the person was lawfully arrested or detained;
(2) whether or not articulable suspicion existed to justify the stop;
(3) the period of time between arrest and testing;
(4) whether or not the person was advised in writing of the rights enumerated in Section 56-5-2950;
(5) whether the person consented to taking a test pursuant to Section 56-5-2950, and the:
(a) reported alcohol concentration at the time of testing was eight one- hundredths of one percent or more;
(b) individual who administered the test or took samples was qualified pursuant to Section 56-5-2950;
(c) tests administered and samples obtained were conducted pursuant to Section 56-5-2950 and regulations adopted pursuant to Section 56-5-2951(Q) and Section 56-5-2953(F); and
(d) machine was working properly.
Nothing contained in this section prohibits the introduction of:
(1) the results of any additional tests of the person's breath or other bodily fluids;
(2) any evidence that may corroborate or question the validity of the breath or bodily fluid test result including, but not limited to:
(a) evidence of field sobriety tests;
(b) evidence of the amount of alcohol consumed by the person; and
(c) evidence of the person's driving;
(3) a videotape of the person's conduct at the incident site and breath testing site taken pursuant to Section 56-5-2953 which is subject to redaction under the South Carolina Rules of Evidence; or
(4) any other evidence of the state of a person's faculties to drive which would call into question the results of a breath or bodily fluid test.
At trial, a person charged with a violation of this section is entitled to a jury instruction stating that the factors enumerated above and the totality of the evidence produced at trial may be used by the jury to determine guilt or innocence.
A person charged with a violation of this section must be given notice of intent to prosecute under the provisions of this section at least fourteen days before his trial date.
SECTION 56-5-2934.
Right to compulsory process.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person charged with a
violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945 who is being
tried in any court of competent jurisdiction in this State has the
right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, documents, or
both, including, but not limited to, state employees charged with the
maintenance of breath testing devices in this State and the
administration of breath testing pursuant to this article. This process
may be issued under the official signature of the magistrate, judge,
clerk, or other officer of the court of competent jurisdiction. The
term "documents" includes, but is not limited to, a copy of the
computer software program of breath testing devices. The portion of
compulsory process provided for in this section that requires the
attendance, at any administrative hearing or court proceeding, of state
employees charged with the maintenance of breath testing devices in
this State and the administration of breath testing pursuant to this
article, takes effect once the compulsory process program at the State
Law Enforcement Division is specifically, fully, and adequately
funded.In addition, at the time of arrest for a violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945, the arresting officer, in addition to other notice requirements, must inform the defendant of his right to all hearings provided by law to include those if a breath test is refused or taken with a result that would require license suspension. The arresting officer, if the defendant wishes to avail himself of any such hearings, depending on the choices made or the breath test results obtained, must provide the defendant with the appropriate form to request the hearing or hearings. The defendant must acknowledge receipt of the notice requirements and receipt of the hearing form if such a hearing or hearings are desired.
SECTION 56-5-2935.
Right to jury trial.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person charged with a
violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945 who is being
tried in any court of competent jurisdiction in this State must have
the right of trial by jury. A person charged with one or more of these
offenses shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury, to be fully informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, documents, or both, and the
right to be fully heard in his defense by himself or by his counsel or,
by both.SECTION 56-5-2936.
Implementation of compulsory testimony requirement postponed; training of employees.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the State Law Enforcement Division is not required to implement the provisions of Section 56-5-2934 as contained in Section 9 of Act 390 of 2000 pertaining to the compulsory process for obtaining witnesses including, but not limited to, state employees charged with the maintenance of breath testing devices in this State and the administration of breath testing pursuant to Chapter 5 of Title 56 of the 1976 Code, until the time the General Assembly is adequately able to fund the program or by December 31, 2002, whichever first occurs. Provided, however, by December 31, 2002, the State Law Enforcement Division must have at least three state employees trained and prepared for the purpose of appearing in court and testifying on the maintenance of breath testing devices and the administration of breath testing pursuant to Chapter 5, Title 56 of the 1976 Code.
SECTION 56-5-2940.
Penalty for violating Sections 56-5-2930 and
56-5-2933; subsequent violations; fines placed in special restricted
accounts.
A person who violates a provision of Section 56-5-2930 or 56-5-2933, upon conviction, entry of a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere, or forfeiture of bail must be punished:
(1) by a fine of four hundred dollars or imprisonment for not less than forty-eight hours nor more than thirty days, for the first offense; however, in lieu of the forty-eight hour minimum imprisonment, the court may provide for forty-eight hours of public service employment. The minimum forty-eight hour imprisonment or public service employment must be served at a time when the person is off from work and does not interfere with his regular employment under terms and conditions as the court considers proper. However, the court may not compel an offender to perform public service employment in lieu of the minimum sentence;
(2) by a fine of not less than two thousand one hundred dollars nor more than five thousand one hundred dollars and imprisonment for not less than five days nor more than one year for the second offense. However, the fine imposed by this item shall not be suspended in an amount less than one thousand one hundred dollars. In lieu of service of imprisonment, the court may require that the individual complete an appropriate term of public service employment of not less than thirty days upon terms and conditions the court considers proper;
(3) by a fine of not less than three thousand eight hundred dollars nor more than six thousand three hundred dollars and imprisonment for not less than sixty days nor more than three years for the third offense;
(4) by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than five years for a fourth offense or subsequent offense.
No part of the minimum sentences provided in this section may be suspended. The court may provide instead of service other sentences provided in this section. For a third or subsequent offense or for a violation of Section 56-5-2945 for great bodily injury, the service of the minimum sentence is mandatory. However, the judge may provide for the sentence to be served upon terms and conditions as he considers proper including, but not limited to, weekend service or nighttime service in any fashion he considers necessary.
The fine for a first offense may not be suspended. The court is prohibited from suspending a monetary fine below that of the next preceding minimum monetary fine.
For the purposes of this chapter any conviction, entry of a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere, or forfeiture of bail for the violation of any law or ordinance of this or any other state or any municipality of this or any other state that prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drugs, or narcotics constitutes a prior offense for the purpose of any prosecution for any subsequent violation hereof. Only those violations which occurred within a period of ten years including and immediately preceding the date of the last violation constitute prior violations within the meaning of this section.
Upon imposition of a sentence of public service, the defendant may apply to the court to be allowed to perform his public service in his county of residence if he has been sentenced to public service in a county where he does not reside.
One hundred dollars of each fine imposed pursuant to this section must be placed by the Comptroller General into a special restricted account to be used by the Department of Public Safety for the Highway Patrol.
Two hundred dollars of the fine imposed pursuant to subsection (3) must be placed by the Comptroller General into a special restricted account to be used by the State Law Enforcement Division to offset the costs of administration of the datamaster, breath testing site video program, ignition interlock provisions, and toxicology laboratory.
SECTION 56-5-2930 and SECTION 56-5-2940 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways is applicable only to those offenses of driving while under the influence of alcoholic beverages which occur within the boundaries of the State of South Carolina, or within the political subdivisions and municipalities herein. 1980 Op Atty Gen, No 80-46, p 92.
Recorder's jurisdiction of second drunk driving offense. A recorder has only jurisdiction to issue an arrest warrant, hold preliminary hearing, and either throw out or send on a second drunk driving offense for disposition before the general sessions court. He would not have authority to try the case and dispose of it for all purposes. 1963-64 Op Atty Gen, No 1612, p 29.
In the absence of legislation expressly stating that the clerk of the circuit court is responsible for transmitting fines imposed in a magistrate's or municipal court for a case transferred to the docket of that court from general sessions, there appears to be no responsibility for the clerk in such regard. However, there appears to be no prohibition to any assistance by the clerk with the consent of the magistrate as to such fines. 1992 Op Atty Gen No. 92-29.
Sentencing judge lacks authority to suspend all or part of monetary fine imposed upon a person convicted of felony DUI. Language contained in Section 56-5-2945, that no part of mandatory "sentences" may be suspended, includes fines imposed as well as imprisonment set forth. 1993 Op Atty Gen No. 93-22.
SECTION 56-5-2941.
Penalties; installation of ignition
interlock device.
In addition to the penalties required and authorized to be imposed against a person violating the provisions of Section 56-5-2930 , 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945, the court may require such person, whether or not he is a first or subsequent offender and if he is a resident of this State, to have installed on the vehicle he was operating if it is registered and licensed in his name or in the name of a member of his immediate family an ignition interlock device designed to prevent the operation of the motor vehicle if the operator has consumed alcoholic beverages. The court in imposing the requirements of this section shall specify the length of time which the interlock device is required to be affixed to the vehicle, shall provide that the cost of the interlock device must be borne by the offender, and shall require the offender to periodically report to appropriate law enforcement or probation authorities for the purpose of verifying that the interlock device is affixed to the vehicle and operational during the time required by the court. The State Law Enforcement Division, in consultation with the Department of Public Safety, shall develop regulations including, but not limited to, regulations governing the use, maintenance, and operation of ignition interlock devices.
If the offender is determined to be indigent by the court and cannot afford the cost of the ignition interlock device, the court may order an interlock device to be affixed to the vehicle and paid for by the jurisdiction making the arrest from fines paid pursuant to Sections 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, and 56-5-2945.
SECTION 56-5-2942.
Vehicle immobilization after conviction for
subsequent violation of Sections 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945;
immobilized defined; identity of immobilized vehicle; surrendering of
license plates and registration; release of vehicle; hearing;
penalties; fees.
(A) A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to
a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or
56-5-2945 must have all motor vehicles owned by or registered to him
immobilized if the person is a resident of this State, unless the
vehicle has been confiscated pursuant to Section 56-5-6240.(B) For purposes of this section, "immobilized" and " immobilization" mean suspension and surrender of the registration and motor vehicle license plate.
(C) Upon sentencing for a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945, the court must ascertain the registration numbers or other information to determine the identity of the vehicles to be immobilized. The court must notify the Department of Motor Vehicles of a person's conviction for a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945 and the identity of the vehicles to be immobilized.
(D) Upon notification by a court in this State or by any other state of a conviction for a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945, the department must require the person convicted to surrender all license plates and vehicle registrations subject to immobilization pursuant to this section. The immobilization is for a period of thirty days to take place during the driver's license suspension pursuant to a conviction for a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945. The department must maintain a record of all vehicles immobilized pursuant to this section.
(E) An immobilized motor vehicle must be released to the holder of a bona fide lien on the motor vehicle when possession of the motor vehicle is requested, as provided by law, by the lienholder for the purpose of foreclosing on and satisfying the lien.
(F) An immobilized motor vehicle may be released by the department without legal or physical restraints to a person who has not been convicted of a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945, if that person is a registered owner of the motor vehicle or a member of the household of a registered owner. The vehicle must be released if an affidavit is submitted by that person to the department stating that:
(1) he regularly drives the motor vehicle subject to immobilization;
(2) the immobilized motor vehicle is necessary to his employment, transportation to an educational facility, or for the performance of essential household duties;
(3) no other vehicle is available for the use of the person;
(4) the person will not authorize the use of the motor vehicle by any other person known by him to have been convicted of a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945;
(5) the person will report immediately to a local law enforcement agency any unauthorized use of the motor vehicle by a person known by him to have been convicted of a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945.
(G) The department may conduct a hearing and receive testimony regarding the veracity of an affidavit submitted pursuant to subsection (F) or issue an agency decision to permit or deny the release of the vehicle based on the affidavit. A person may seek relief pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act from an agency action immobilizing a vehicle or denying the release of the vehicle.
(H) A person who operates an immobilized vehicle except as provided in subsections (E) and (F) is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days.
(I) A person who falsifies a report concerning vehicles owned by or registered to that person, or who fails to surrender registrations and license plates pursuant to this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days.
(J) The court must assess a fee of forty dollars for each motor vehicle owned by or registered to the person convicted of a second or subsequent violation of Section 56-5-2930, 56-5-2933, or 56-5-2945. This fee must be placed by the Comptroller General into a special restricted interest bearing account to be used by the Department of Motor Vehicles to defray the expenses of the Department of Motor Vehicles.
SECTION 56-5-2945.
Causing great bodily injury or death by
operating vehicle while under influence of drugs or alcohol; penalty;
"great bodily injury" defined; fines placed in special restricted
account.
(A) A person who, while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or the combination of alcohol and drugs, drives a vehicle and when driving does any act forbidden by law or neglects any duty imposed by law in the driving of the vehicle, which act or neglect proximately causes great bodily injury or death to a person other than himself, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction must be punished:
(1) by a mandatory fine of not less than five thousand one hundred dollars nor more than ten thousand one hundred dollars and mandatory imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more than fifteen years when great bodily injury results;
(2) by a mandatory fine of not less than ten thousand one hundred dollars nor more than twenty-five thousand one hundred dollars and mandatory imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than twenty-five years when death results.
A part of the mandatory sentences required to be imposed by this section must not be suspended, and probation must not be granted for any portion.
(B) As used in this section, "great bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
The Department of Motor Vehicles must suspend the driver's license of a person who is convicted or who receives sentence upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere pursuant to this section for a period to include a term of imprisonment plus three years.
(C) One hundred dollars of each fine imposed pursuant to this section must be placed by the Comptroller General into a special restricted account to be used by the Department of Public Safety for the Highway Patrol.
SECTION 56-5-2945 does not expressly repeal the existing offenses of involuntary manslaughter and reckless homicide, and construction of the statute indicates that repeal by implication is not intended. State v. Bodiford (S.C. 1984) 282 S.C. 378, 318 S.E.2d 567.
3. Lesser included offenses
Reckless driving is not a lesser included offense of felony driving under the influence (DUI), since recklessness is not required to support a conviction for felony DUI. State v. Cribb (S.C. 1992) 310 S.C. 518, 426 S.E.2d 306. Indictment And Information 191(.5)
Reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter are not lesser included offenses of felony driving under the influence (DUI) since recklessness is not required to support a conviction for felony DUI, thus overruling prior case law to the contrary. State v. Cribb (S.C. 1992) 310 S.C. 518, 426 S.E.2d 306. Indictment And Information 191(.5)
4. Jeopardy
Double jeopardy will bar conviction where the state attempts to prove felony driving under the influence with proof of a violation of the same law under which the defendant has already been convicted in magistrate's court. State v. Grampus (S.C. 1986) 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26. Double Jeopardy 142
Felony driving under the influence prosecution violated defendants constitutional protection against double jeopardy where the lane change violation, which was critical to the felony prosecution, was the same offense for which defendant had previously been convicted in magistrate's court. State v. Grampus (S.C. 1986) 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26.
5. Indictment
Indictment charging defendant with felony driving under the influence (DUI) resulting in death was sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the circuit court; indictment contained virtually identical language to that contained in the statute defining the offense, thorough review of the record disclosed no indications of uncertainty in regard to the crime with which defendant was charged, and because she pled guilty, it was clear she was aware of the nature of the charge against her. State v. Campbell (S.C.App. 2004) 361 S.C. 529, 605 S.E.2d 576. Indictment And Information 110(47)
The indictment must state with particularity the act forbidden by law or duty imposed by law which will be relied on by the state to support the felony driving under the influence charge. State v. Grampus (S.C. 1986) 288 S.C. 395, 343 S.E.2d 26.
6. Expert witnesses
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying as an expert a police officer who testified, in a trial for felony driving under the influence, that he observed a "gouge mark" in the victim's lane "indicating to [him] that the collision had taken place in [the victim's] lane" where the officer testified that (1) he had received 12 weeks training in the state Highway Department Academy which included specific training on determining the point of impact in an accident investigation, (2) he spent one week in on-the-road training with a municipal police force, and (3) he had been a state trooper with 4-5 months' experience at the time of the crime. State v. Goode (S.C.App. 1991) 305 S.C. 176, 406 S.E.2d 391.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying as an expert a police officer who testified, in a trial for felony driving under the influence, as to the defendant's post impact speed where the officer was a 16-year veteran with the Highway Patrol, had received advanced accident investigation and reconstruction training, and had investigated approximately 1600 accidents. State v. Goode (S.C.App. 1991) 305 S.C. 176, 406 S.E.2d 391.
A lab technologist was not qualified as an expert to testify that a person with a blood alcohol reading in excess of .100 milligrams per deciliter is considered intoxicated. Although competent to conduct tests determining blood alcohol content, the technologist admitted that he had no training whatsoever in determining the effect of alcohol upon the human system and, therefore, his testimony on the issue of intoxication was inadmissible. State v. Priester (S.C. 1990) 301 S.C. 165, 391 S.E.2d 227.
7. Multiple convictions
Three convictions for felony driving under influence (DUI) arising out of single accident subjected motorist to three separate and consecutive three-year driver's license suspensions, rather than one three-year suspension. Thompson v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety (S.C. 1999) 335 S.C. 52, 515 S.E.2d 761, rehearing denied. Automobiles 144.2(8)
A defendant's multiple convictions for driving under the influence causing death, reckless homicide, felony driving under the influence causing great bodily injury along, and assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause; although the convictions all arose from a single incident, they were separate offenses. State v. Easler (S.C.App. 1996) 322 S.C. 333, 471 S.E.2d 745, rehearing denied, certiorari granted, affirmed as modified 327 S.C. 121, 489 S.E.2d 617.
8. Admissibility of evidence
In prosecutions for driving under the influence (DUI), when moving to admit blood alcohol test results, the State must prove a chain of custody of the blood sample from the time it is drawn until it is tested. Ex parte Department of Health and Environmental Control (S.C. 2002) 350 S.C. 243, 565 S.E.2d 293. Automobiles 425
In a prosecution for felony driving under the influence, the trial court properly allowed the state's forensic toxicologist, who qualified as an expert witness, to testify concerning the elimination rate of alcohol and the effects of benzodiazepine when used in combination with alcohol after admitting that different "benzos" have difference effects and he did not know which benzodiazepine the defendant had taken, since such factors went to the weight of the testimony, and not its admissibility. State v. White (S.C.App. 1993) 311 S.C. 289, 428 S.E.2d 740, rehearing denied. Criminal Law 486(7)
In a prosecution for felony driving under the influence, the State sufficiently established the chain of custody of the defendant's blood sample where each person who handled the blood sample testified at trial, and a lab technologist testified that the samples she picked up from the nurses' desk at the hospital were identified by the receiving nurse as the defendant's and were clearly labeled with his name. State v. Priester (S.C. 1990) 301 S.C. 165, 391 S.E.2d 227.
9. Term of imprisonment
Probation, a suspension of the period of incarceration, is part of a criminal defendant's "term of imprisonment," as is actual incarceration, parole, the suspended portion of a sentence, and supervised furlough. Thompson v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety (S.C. 1999) 335 S.C. 52, 515 S.E.2d 761, rehearing denied. Sentencing And Punishment 1165; Sentencing And Punishment 1167; Sentencing And Punishment 1168
"Term of imprisonment," as used in portion of felony driving under influence (DUI) statute which provides that driver's license of any person convicted thereunder shall be suspended for period to include any term of imprisonment plus three years, means non-fine part of criminal sentence, and includes suspended portions, probation or parole periods, and supervised furlough; it is not limited to period of actual incarceration; overruling Davis v. South Carolina Dep't of Public Safety, 328 S.C. 578, 493 S.E.2d 871. Thompson v. South Carolina Dept. of Public Safety (S.C. 1999) 335 S.C. 52, 515 S.E.2d 761, rehearing denied. Automobiles 144.2(8)
SECTION 56-5-2946.
Submission to testing for alcohol or
drugs.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person must submit to either one or a combination of chemical tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of alcohol and drugs if there is probable cause to believe that the person violated or is under arrest for a violation of Section 56-5-2945.
The tests must be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that the person violated or is under arrest for a violation of Section 56-5-2945. The administration of one test does not preclude the administration of other tests. The resistance, obstruction, or opposition to testing pursuant to this section is evidence admissible at the trial of the offense which precipitated the requirement for testing. A person who is tested or gives samples for testing may have a qualified person of his choice conduct additional tests at his expense and must be notified of that right. A person's request or failure to request additional blood or urine tests is not admissible against the person in the criminal trial.
The provisions of Section 56-5-2950, relating to the administration of tests to determine a person's alcohol concentration, additional tests at the person's expense, the availability of other evidence on the question of whether or not the person was under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of them, availability of test information to the person or his attorney, and the liability of medical institutions and persons administering the tests are applicable to this section and also extend to the officer requesting the test, the State or its political subdivisions, or governmental agency, or entity which employs the officer making the request, and the agency, institution, or employer, either governmental or private, of persons administering the tests. Notwithstanding any other provision of state law pertaining to confidentiality of hospital records or other medical records, information regarding tests performed pursuant to this section must be released, upon subpoena, to a court, prosecuting attorney, defense attorney, or law enforcement officer in connection with an alleged violation of Section 56-5-2945.